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 Abstract 
 
As part of the Kyoto Protocol, many countries have committed themselves to 
substantially reduce the emission of greenhouse gases within a politically imposed time 
constraint. Investment subsidies can be an important instrument to stimulate the 
adoption of energy-saving technologies to achieve emission reduction targets. This 
paper addresses the impact of adoption subsidies on the amount of energy savings, 
taking into account both the endogenous and uncertain nature of technological progress. 
Neglecting these two characteristics of technological progress tends to result in 
overestimation of the short-run effectiveness of investment subsidies, whereas the long-
run effects are ambiguous.  
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1. Introduction 
 
Mitigation of global climate change asks for significant reductions in the emission of 
greenhouse gases. Under the Kyoto Protocol governments of most industrialized 
countries have taken a first important step in that direction by committing themselves to 
substantially reduce their countries’ emissions within a specific time horizon. Hence, 
important questions arise concerning how and when to stimulate the adoption of, for 
example, energy-saving technologies (Grubb 1997, OECD 1999). Answering these 
questions requires insight in processes of technological change. The main characteristic 
of technological change is its inherent uncertainty, both in terms of the arrival of new 
varieties of a technology and their performance, where the rate of technological 
progress may be driven by, among others, learning effects (see, for example, David 
1975, Dosi 1988, Grübler et al. 1999, OECD/IEA 2000). With respect to technology 
adoption, two major stylized facts are (i) the (at least partly) irreversible nature of 
investments2 which, in combination with uncertain technological change, gives an 
incentive to postpone investments to limit the likelihood of regret (see for example Dixit 
and Pindyck 1994, Farzin et al. 1998, Pindyck 1991), and (ii) heterogeneity among 
firms or industries which results in the typical S-shaped diffusion patterns that we 
observe in reality (for example, Davies 1979, Jaffe and Stavins 1994, Stoneman 2001). 
The challenge for government technology policies is to develop policies aimed at 
achieving the macroeconomic or generic goals imposed by emission reduction targets, 
while taking into account these microeconomic characteristics that determine adoption 
behavior of individual firms. 
 
In this paper, we analyze the effectiveness of investment subsidies in achieving 
emission reductions taking into account the stylized facts of technological change and 
technology adoption. We analyze the impact of uncertain technological progress by 
explicitly taking into account the option value of postponing the adoption (that is, the 
opportunity cost of immediate investment). We find that standard NPV analyses result 
in an incorrect assessment of energy savings, both in the short and long term. The 
reason is that under the assumption of stochastic rates of technological progress, the 
energy savings that are not achieved in the short run due to the postponement of the 
adoption, may be (more than) compensated in the longer run due to the adoption of a 
superior technology. This implies that granting subsidies that tend to speed up adoption 
may have an adverse impact on long-run energy savings. We analyze the sensitivity of 
these results for the nature of technological progress by allowing for different 
assumptions with respect to learning- or spillover effects, the success of innovation, the 
speed of quality improvement, the discount rate and the existence of (physical) upper 
bounds of a technology’s energy-saving potential.   
                                                                 
2  Investments are said to be irreversible if not all costs associated with the technology 
adoption can be recouped. Two important sources of irreversibility are the installation 
costs, and the fact that the resale value of the machinery generally falls short of the 
purchase price. 
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The results are interesting from a policy point of view because of the politically 
imposed time constraints for emission reductions. Traditional investment theories (for 
example, Stoneman and David 1984) would suggest the presence of a ‘double dividend’ 
associated with subsidizing the adoption of energy-saving technologies that are subject 
to learning effects. Not only do subsidies induce (immediate) adoption to meet 
politically imposed targets, they also induce further technological progress since 
technology adoption induces the ‘take off’ of learning effects. In this paper we illustrate 
with a simple model that once uncertainty is recognized as an important investment 
decision parameter, a trade-off emerges between early adoption of relatively inferior 
technologies on the one hand and late adoption of relatively superior technologies on 
the other hand. These results translate directly into a trade-off between short- and long-
run emission reduction targets.  
 
There are several related articles on investment under uncertainty, in which learning 
plays an important role. However, our paper differs from that literature as we focus on 
the uncertainty of technological progress rather than, for example, output price 
uncertainty (e.g., Majd and Pindyck 1989) or investment cost uncertainty (Purvis et al. 
1995), and specifically acknowledge industry heterogeneity (compare with Alvarez and 
Amman 1999). Similar to Balcer and Lippman (1984), technology adoption in our 
model occurs if the technology lag exceeds a certain threshold. Apart from learning, we 
do not consider other types of firm interactions (compare with Choi 1994 who 
incorporates network externalities) and we also ignore explicit non-convexities in 
environmental damages that necessitate adoption as do Dosi and Moretto (1997).  
 
The set-up of this paper is as follows. In section 2 we develop a simple model that 
captures the essence of investment under technological uncertainty. In section 3, we 
derive optimal adoption behavior with and without ignoring the option value of 
postponement. We analyze the consequences of uncertainty for optimal investment 
behavior in terms of cumulative energy savings. Section 4 assesses the effects of 
subsidy schemes on the diffusion of technologies. We analyze the sensitivity of the 
model in terms of cumulative energy savings by allowing for different assumptions with 
respect to the nature of technological progress. Section 5 concludes.  
 
2.  The model 
 
We model a simple economy with N  firms that can potentially benefit from the 
adoption of a specific technology in terms of reducing the amount of energy used. Over 
time, better vintages (indexed i) of that technology become available (with identical 
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purchase price K).3 To model irreversibility, we simply assume that firms can invest 
only once (see Farzin et al. 1998 for a more general model allowing for multiple 
investments). This is clearly an extreme case of an irreversible investment, but the 
qualitative results of the model spill over to other cases where investments are at best 
partially reversible (for example, when there are scrap markets for obsolete 
technologies), or when firms are allowed to invest more than once.  
 Vintage i can provide a maximum amount of per-period energy savings 
(measured in monetary terms) equal to Ri. We assume that firms (indexed Nn ,...,1= ) 
are able to only reap a fraction (between zero and one) of the maximum potential energy 
savings, and that that fraction is firm-specific (i.e., 10 £< nq ). In addition, we assume 
that firms can be ranked according to that parameter )(nnq  with 0/ <¶¶ nnq . In other 
words, all else equal, firm number 1 ( )N  is most (least) likely to adopt the technology as 
its per-period monetary savings from the adoption of vintage i are equal to Ri (close to 
zero). The technology has an infinite life time and its performance, once adopted, does 
not change over time. Therefore, there is no uncertainty with respect to a new vintage’s 
performance as soon as it is adopted, and hence the discounted value of the 
instantaneous profit stream from adopting vintage i for firm n can be defined as: 
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where r is the (exogenous) discount rate. 
 
Following Farzin et al. (1998) we assume that in each short period dt, there is a certain 
probability that a new improved vintage of the technology is discovered. Assuming a 
jump process, let the likelihood of a discovery in that very short period be denoted by 
ltdt, and the actual size of the jump by ut. Then technological improvement can be 
modeled as follows:  
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To model endogenous technological progress through (external) learning-by-doing, we 
assume that the likelihood lt of a new improved variety being discovered consists of an 
exogenous part ( )0l  and a part that is an increasing function of the number of firms that 
have already adopted the technology (Nt):  
                                                                 
3  For simplicity, we assume that all new varieties of the technology require the same gross 
investment expenditures (K). If we assume that there is a scrap market for old 
technologies, K should be interpreted as the net adoption cost, that is, the costs of 
adopting the new technology minus the scrap value of the old one. The arrival of new 
technologies may cause the price of older technologies to decrease. This effect is 
ignored.  
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(3) ( )0, lll tt N= , 
 
with 0/ >¶¶ Nl  and 0/ 22 <¶¶ Nl . This formulation captures the idea that the 
probability of the arrival of an improved version of the technology increases with the 
number of firms that is using it, representing a learning effect that is external to each 
individual adopter.4 In other words, only those firms that have not yet adopted the new 
technology can reap the returns of improvements of technological performance: early 
adopters generate a positive externality to all other firms that are considering to 
purchase the technology (Kapur 1995). The underlying mechanism may be via the 
producer being informed through feedback from early adopters. Essentially, this 
reinforces the irreversible nature of adoption decisions and emphasizes the existence of 
lock-in effects. Furthermore, we assume that external learning-by-doing occurs at a 
decreasing rate due to the increased probability of duplication. 
 
In addition to uncertainty associated with the timing of the emergence of new, improved 
vintages, we assume that the improvement itself is also ex ante uncertain. We formalize 
this by assuming uncertainty with respect to the size of the jump in energy efficiency. 
Furthermore, we assume that there is a maximum feasible efficiency for the technology 
(denoted by R ), and that the actual improvement of the technology in terms of new 
vintages is a decreasing function of the quality the technology already attained. In other 
words, we assume that a technology matures over time: 
(4) ( )RRuu t ,= , with 0/ <¶¶ Ru , 
where tu  represents the maximum possible increase in the quality of the technology at 
time t. Given the range of possible jumps ],0 tu< , we assume for the time being that the 
realized technological improvement is uniformly distributed over the interval, and hence 
the associated density function can be defined as follows: 
(5) 
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The firm’s decision process can now be summarized as follows. In each period, until the 
investment is actually made, the firm has to decide whether it is going to invest or 
postpone the decision to invest to the next period. When exercising the option to adopt, 
the firm gets the pay-off Vn(Ri) (that is, the present value of the profit stream as defined 
in equation 1) and pays the net adoption cost which equals the investment cost (K) 
                                                                 
4  We thus ignore learning-by-using, which is the effect that adopters themselves gain 
experience with the use of the particular technology and hence realize a quality 
improvement and/or a cost reduction at the plant level (Rosenberg 1976).  
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minus the amount of subsidies received (S). Using (1), firm n’s net present value of the 
decision to adopt vintage i, )( in RW , is given by: 
(6)  ( ) ( )SK
r
R
SKRVR ininin --=--=W
q
)()( . 
This value is often referred to as the ‘termination value’ of the option to adopt. If the 
investment is perfectly reversible, firms will invest whenever the termination value is 
positive (and hence the simple NPV rule applies). If investments are, however, not 
perfectly (and costlessly) reversible, having adopted a particular vintage can give rise to 
regret in future periods if new vintages arrive that outperform the purchased version. 
Therefore, the firm has to take into account the option to postpone the investment 
decision to future periods. The value of postponing the investment for a very short 
period dt is the difference between the termination value (as given by (6)) and the 
(discounted) value of the investment option as evaluated in that next period, which 
includes the expected capital gain in the form of the arrival of a new improved version 
of the technology. This latter value is usually referred to as the ‘continuation value’, 
which for the nth firm can be written as follows: 
(7) ( ) ( )[ ]dRRFE
rdt
RF nn ++
=
1
1
. 
The difference between (7) and (6) is the option value of postponing the investment. In 
each period, the firm compares the termination value of the option to adopt in (6) with 
the continuation value given by (7). The opportunity costs of postponing adoption at 
time t are foregone profits associated with the fact that the best available technology at 
that time is not implemented. They increase over time because of ongoing technological 
progress, and hence the termination value will dominate the continuation value at some 
future point in time. Hence, for each firm there exists a critical technological quality or 
savings potential, denoted Rn
*, at which the firm is indifferent between investing and 
postponing. Adoption occurs as soon as the actual savings exceed that critical value. 
 
To illustrate the basic mechanisms of the model, we turn in the next section to a 
simplified version of the model that highlights the importance of accounting for 
technological uncertainty. The implications of the learning-by-doing effects and the 
technological maturation are postponed to Section 4. 
 
3. The impact of uncertainty on technology adoption 
 
In order to illustrate the effect of taking into account the impact of stochasticity with 
respect to the rate of technological progress on adoption behavior, we simplify the 
model described in the previous section by assuming the rate of technological progress 
to be exogenous (i.e., there is no learning by doing), and by assuming that there is no 
physical limit with respect to the energy-saving benefits (i.e., there is no maturation). 
Technically, we specify equations (3) and (4) as 0ll =t  and uu t = , respectively. 
Hence, the process of technological progress (2) can be written as: 
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and the associated density function (5) as 
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Equation (5’) implies that the expected technological jump equals 2/u . For analytical 
tractability, we explicitly specify the fraction of the benefits of adoption that can be 
captured by firm n as: 
(8) .
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This specification of the benefit parameter nq  implies a non-uniform distribution of 
benefits from adoption among firms. The distribution is chosen such that the majority of 
the firms is located around the middle of the distribution space. These firms are 
characterized by an ‘average’ benefit from adoption. A minority of the firms is located 
at both ends of the distribution space. These firms either face ‘large’ or ‘small’ benefits 
from adoption. Figure 1 illustrates this: firms with a low index (n) benefit relatively 
much from adoption (and vice versa), while the majority of firms is clustered around the 
'average' benefit from adoption.  
 
To solve the model, we follow Farzin et al. (1998) and determine the critical quality of 
the technology (Rn
*) by equating the continuation and the termination value (equations 7 
and 6, respectively); see Appendix A for technical details. This critical quality of the 
technology at which firm n will exercise its option to adopt equals: 
(9) 
( )
r
uSKrR
n
n
l
q 2
1* +-= . 
This expression reveals that the critical technology level in the presence of uncertainty 
is equal to the critical technology level in the (theoretical) case that firms simply apply 
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the standard Net Present Value rule (the first term on the RHS of equation 9),5 plus a 
factor that is associated with uncertainty (the second term on the RHS). Technologies 
that are profitable from a NPV-perspective are thus not necessarily profitable when 
taking into account uncertainty. Evidently, the higher the expected capital gains (as a 
result of either a higher likelihood of technological progress l , or because of larger 
expected improvements 2/u ), the better the critical performance of the technology 
should be in order to trigger adoption. 
 
Figure 1.  Benefits of adoption for firm n (n=1, …, N =1000) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In the absence of learning effects, we can derive an analytical solution for the number of 
firms that has adopted at a particular point in time as a function of the quality of the 
technology at that time (Rt). When firms are assumed to apply the NPV-rule (see 
footnote 5), the number of firms that has adopted at time t can be determined by 
combining equation (8) and NPVnR . This yields: 
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5  In a world without irreversibility, the appropriate decision criterion is the standard NPV 
rule, which says that investment should occur as soon as the (expected) net present value 
of adoption is positive. This holds  if )( in RW  (equation 6) is larger than or equal to zero. 
The NPV criterion thus equals ( ) nNPVn SKrR q/-= . 
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When investments are irreversible and firms take uncertainty into account, the number 
of adopters at time t can be found by combining equations (8) and (9):  
(11) 3
/5.0
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For illustrational purposes, we have taken a set of parameter values and conducted a 
Monte Carlo simulation with 1000 runs based on random draws from the distributions 
of the uncertain parameters u and l.6 Figure 2 depicts the diffusion path of the 
technology, averaged over the 1000 simulation runs. It illustrates that adoption lags 
behind when firms take into account uncertainty about technological progress in their 
investment decisions.  
 
Figure 2. Diffusion paths of the technology in the case of investment under 
uncertainty (UNC) and investment under the standard Net Present Value 
rule (NPV). 
 
The consequences of these different diffusion patterns that reflect differences in 
adoption behavior for aggregate energy savings are illustrated in Figures 3a-c. The 
Figures depict the per-period energy savings (measured in monetary terms) that are 
achieved under the two investment rules for three different levels of technological 
                                                                 
6  The following parameter values were used: u = 0.03, l = 0.3, R0 = 0.1, N = 1000, K = 1, 
S = 0.3 and r = 0.1. We refer to these values as the baseline scenario.  
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sophistication. The upward-sloping curves depict the critical savings level (on the 
vertical axis) that triggers the investment for each firm type n (ranked on the horizontal 
axis according to decreasing net benefit from adoption). As is clear from equation (9), 
*
nR  is an increasing function of n (as nq  is decreasing in n), and the critical value taking 
into account uncertainty strictly exceeds the critical value based on the NPV criterion 
alone (the difference being ru 2/l ). Therefore, as technology progresses (R increases 
along the vertical axis), one by one firms will adopt, depending on the fraction of the 
benefits they can reap.  
 
Figure 3. Per-period energy savings for different investment rules. (a) Infant 
Technology, adoption only under NPV rule, (b) Technology has progressed, different 
levels of adoption under NPV and uncertainty rule and (c) Mature technology, all firms 
have adopted. 
 
Figure 3a 
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Figure 3c 
 
 
In Figure 3a, the technology is still in its infancy; the amount of energy saved by the 
technology (Rt) is fairly low. The level of technological quality is not sufficient to 
trigger investment by adopters that take uncertainty into account, and their total savings 
(at one period in time) are thus zero in this instance. The number of firms that invest 
when they behave according to the NPV rule is positive and equals Na
NPV. The per-
period savings are then equal to the shaded area under curve 2. In Figure 3b, the 
technology has improved somewhat further. In case firms take into account uncertainty, 
the number of adopters equals Nb
UNC, whereas the number of adopters when firms 
behave according to a NPV rule is Nb
NPV. The difference in savings between the two 
‘regimes’ can be calculated by subtracting surface A from surface B in Figure 3b. The 
net result denotes the additional savings when firms invest according to a NPV rule as 
compared to investment under uncertainty. At initial stages of technological progress 
(where energy savings are fairly low), this difference is positive. However, when the 
technology further improves, the difference becomes negative. The extreme of this final 
stage is depicted in Figure 3c, in which the technology has progressed to the extent that 
all firms have found it profitable to adopt the technology under consideration, 
independent of the adoption criterion used. In that case, the total savings in the regime 
where firms invest taking into account uncertainty unambiguously exceed the savings in 
the regime where firms invest according to an NPV-rule. This is caused by the fact that 
although the former type of firms that takes into account uncertainty adopts at a later 
point in time, they also adopt relatively better technologies.  
 
The fact that adoption lags behind when firms take into account uncertainty about 
technological progress in their investment decisions, is thus not necessarily bad from an 
energy-saving point of view. In the longer run, total energy savings will increase due to 
the adoption of improved technologies. In other words, neglecting the effects of 
uncertainty on the adoption behavior of firms results in an overestimation of short-run 
energy savings while long-run energy savings tend to be underestimated. 
 
R t 
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4. The effectiveness of subsidies 
 
So far, we have ignored the role of learning effects and the possibility of technological 
maturation. In this section, we relax these conditions and analyze the impact of adoption 
subsidies on (i) the timing of adoption and (ii) aggregate energy savings over time while 
taking into account learning and maturation. For tractability, we numerically analyze 
these effects by comparing the results for a low and a high subsidy level. 
 
In order to be able to perform a numerical analysis, we need to specify the probability of 
the arrival of a new vintage and the size of the jump as described in equations (3) and 
(4). The likelihood of a technological improvement (lt) is specified as:  
 (3’) ball tt N+= 0 . 
This formulation captures the idea that the probability of a technological improvement 
increases with the number of firms using that technology. This represents the learning 
effect. We assume that learning occurs at a decreasing rate due to the increased 
probability of duplication (b<1). The maximum size of the improvement of the 
technology is specified as:  
(4’) tt RRu g-= . 
The technology has thus matured when g/RRt = . At that level, uncertainty regarding 
technological progress is completely absent. 
 
Totally differentiating the number of adopters at each point in time (Nt) as defined in 
equation (11) with respect to the subsidies, we find that subsidies unambiguously speed 
up the diffusion process. The effect of subsidies on the level of aggregate energy 
savings is, however, ambiguous. Although subsidies speed up adoption and thus 
increase short-run energy savings, accumulated energy savings can be negatively 
affected since earlier adoption also implies adoption of relatively inferior technologies. 
Since we assume that firms invest only once, high subsidies may thus contribute to the 
occurrence of a lock-in that is not optimal from a policy perspective. Putting the 
argument the other way around: a low subsidy level leads, ceteris paribus, to a relatively 
slow diffusion of energy-saving technologies, but therefore also to the adoption of 
relatively better technologies. As a result, accumulated energy savings can be positively 
affected by low subsidies in the longer run since low subsidies can avoid a lock-in into 
inferior technologies. 
 
To illustrate this, we conducted again a series of Monte Carlo simulations with 1000 
runs based on random draws from the distributions of the parameters u and l. We 
analyzed aggregate energy savings over time for two different subsidy levels: a low and 
a high one. In order to analyze the robustness of the results for specific parameter 
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values, we conducted an extensive sensitivity analysis with respect to a (the degree of 
learning), r (the discount rate), g (the speed of technology maturation), l0 (the 
exogenous arrival of new technologies; innovation success) and R  (the level of 
maturation).  
Depending on the assumptions regarding technological maturation and learning, we can 
distinguish four versions of the model. Each version is characterized by a specific 
pattern of expected technological improvement. The four possibilities are depicted in 
Table 1.7 
 
Table 1. Expected technology improvement under four different assumptions with 
respect to the parameter values 
 
Quadrant A reflects the simple version of the model in which maturation and learning 
are neglected. One can think here of a small open economy in which innovations take 
place abroad, and are thus exogenous to the domestic country, whereas domestically no 
knowledge spill-overs occur. In this case the expected technological improvement is 
constant over time since both l and u are exogenous and constant. This is the case that 
was discussed in section 3. In quadrant B learning is introduced, while technological 
quality is still unbounded. This implies that ut is constant, while lt is a positive function 
                                                                 
7  We used the baseline scenario (see footnote 6) and put a = 0.03, b = 0.75 and g = 0.03. 
 
Exogenous technical change 
a = 0 
Endogenous technical change 
a > 0 
Non- 
maturation 
g = 0 
Maturation 
g > 0 
B 
C 
A 
D 
Time 
lm 
Time 
lm 
Time 
lm 
Time 
lm 
 19 
of the number of adopters (see equation 3’). The technology is expected to improve at 
an ever faster rate as long as the number of adopters increases, but as soon as the model 
converges to the steady state, expected technological improvement becomes constant. 
The steady state is characterized by a situation in which all firms have adopted the 
technology ( NN t = ). Quadrant C depicts the pattern of technological improvement in 
the absence of learning, but with bounded technological improvement. Now, lt is 
constant while ut is a decreasing function of the quality of the technology (Rt) already 
attained (see equation 4’). A steady state will be reached with a constant number of 
adopters that is potentially smaller than N , a constant technological quality, and no 
uncertainty regarding technological progress. Finally, the hump -shaped pattern in 
Quadrant D results from the combination of learning and maturation. An increase in the 
number of adopters results in an increasing probability lt of a technology improvement. 
On the other hand, the resulting increase in the quality of the technology implies a 
decline in the remaining potential for further improvement. For reasonable parameter 
values, the second effect starts to dominate the first effect after a while, leading to the 
hump-shaped curve. A steady state will be reached that is qualitatively similar to the 
steady state described in the former case (Quadrant C). 
 
We will now discuss the effects of subsidies on aggregate energy savings for the 
different cases that can be distinguished. Extensive sensitivity analysis for different 
parameter values has shown two possible outcomes of the model:  
1. A high subsidy leads to a relatively high level of aggregate energy savings in both 
the short and the long run. In this case, the effect of the higher number of adopters 
caused by the higher subsidy – which we further refer to as the Scale Effect – 
dominates the low average quality of the adopted technologies associated with 
higher subsidies (further denoted as the Quality Effect). This case is illustrated in 
Figure 4; 
2. A high subsidy leads to a relatively high level of aggregate energy savings in the 
short run, but to a relatively low level in the long run, since the slow adoption under 
a low subsidy regime is compensated by the adoption of relatively better 
technologies in the long run. So, in this case, the Scale and Quality Effects compete 
with each other, which results in a trade-off between the short- and long run (see 
Figure 5). 
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Figure 4   The Scale Effect 
 
 
Figure 5. Trade-off between short- and long-run energy savings due to the opposed 
impact of the Scale and Quality Effects  
 
 
The Scale Effect can only dominate in the long run if the technology matures over time. 
In the absence of maturation, all firms adopt the technology in the long run since the 
unbounded technological improvement assures that in the end even for the last firm – 
which has lowest benefit from adoption (see Figure 1) – the quality of the technology 
exceeds its critical level as defined in equation (9). When we allow for technological 
improvement to be bounded from above, at the time of maturation of the technology a 
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stationary situation can aris e in which not all firms have adopted the energy-saving 
technology (see Figure 6).  
 
Figure 6.  Number of adopters if technology matures. 
 
The reason for this is that for a number of firms – those with a low benefit from 
adoption – the quality of the technology does not exceed the critical quality they face. A 
high subsidy scheme then results in relatively more firms adopting the energy-saving 
technology, since subsidies decrease the critical technology level (see equation 9). This 
Scale Effect can outweigh the effect associated with the adoption of relatively inferior 
technologies. The obvious condition for the latter to occur is that in the steady state the 
number of adopters under a high subsidy regime is sufficiently larger than the number 
of adopters under a low subsidy regime.  
 
The series of Monte Carlo simulations we performed proved that this condition is met if 
we have a relatively slow diffusion process in the absence of subsidies. This is 
intuitively clear as slow diffusion reduces the chance that the Quality Effect starts to 
dominate. Diffusion is relatively slow if we have, ceteris paribus, a low learning rate 
(a), a high speed of exogenous arrival of new technologies (l0), a high level of 
exogenous maturation (u0), a high discount rate (r) or a fast speed of maturation (g). To 
see this, recall that equation (9) implies that an increase in expected technology 
improvement ( ul ) or discount rate (r) will raise the critical technology level. This 
slows down adoption since the quality of the technology should be higher to trigger 
adoption. Intuitively, when large technological improvements are to be expected, firms 
postpone adoption. The same arguments hold for a high value of g : large jumps in 
technological improvement lead to a delay in adoption since better technologies can be 
expected within short time. A low learning rate implies that late adopters reap only 
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limited benefits from early adopters’ experience, as a result of which technological 
improvement is relatively slow. In sum, if parameter values are chosen such that 
diffusion is relatively slow in itself, then subsidies can play an important role in 
stimulating adoption and the resulting increase in the number of adopters can be 
sufficiently large to compensate for the relatively inferior technologies adopted.  
 
If parameter values are chosen such that diffusion is relatively fast in absence of 
subsidies, the number of additional adopters due to a higher subsidy is limited and is not 
necessarily sufficient to outweigh the negative effect of adopting relatively inferior 
technologies. This leads to the dominance of the Quality Effect: increasing subsidies do 
have a beneficial effect on energy savings in the short run, but a negative effect in the 
long run due to the lock-in in technologies of a relatively inferior quality. We 
summarize these results in Table 2.  
 
Table 2. Effect of subsidies on aggregate energy savings under four different 
assumptions 
 
In sum, investment subsidies are most effective if they stimulate aggregate energy 
savings while avoiding a lock-in in inferior technologies. In the context of our simple 
model, this criterion is most likely to be fulfilled if the diffusion process is slow in the 
absence of subsidies. In this situation, subsidies significantly increase the number of 
adopters and thereby aggregate energy savings, while a lock-in in inferior technologies 
is likely to be avoided. The reasons for a slow rate of adoption can be various: a low 
degree of knowledge spill-overs, a high discount rate, or the expectation of significant 
technological improvements in the (near) future.  
 
 
 
 
Exogenous technical change 
a = 0 
Endogenous technical change 
a > 0 
Non- 
maturation 
g = 0  
Maturation 
g > 0  
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Quality  Effect Quality  Effect 
Quality  Effect Quality  Effect 
Scale Effect Scale Effect 
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5. Conclusions  
 
Governments of many industrialized countries have committed themselves to achieving 
a certain level of greenhouse gas emission reduction within a certain short period of 
time. There is a plethora of available energy-saving technologies, ranging from new 
technologies where efficiency improvements are still possible (and subject to learning 
effects) to more mature technologies where the level of efficiency is mo re or less fixed. 
Subsidizing technology adoption induces investments because of increased profitability. 
However, the state of the technologies is not fixed: generally, their performance 
improves over time while the speed and extent of the improvements is  uncertain.  
 
To analyze the effects of uncertainty, the nature of technological progress and subsidies 
on adoption behavior in both the short and the long run, we developed a model 
integrating insights on technology adoption and investment behavior under uncertainty. 
A first result that we derived is that neglecting the effects of uncertainty on investment 
behavior results in an overestimation of short-run savings and an underestimation of 
long-run savings. Subsidies were shown to raise the speed at which firms adopt. This 
unambiguously fosters energy savings in the short run. In the longer run, however, 
account has to be taken of the quality of the technologies that are being adopted. The 
delayed response of firms receiving a low subsidy results in – on average – the  
adoption of better technologies. In the long-run, this quality effect may dominate the 
short-run effect of increased adoption of technologies in terms of the level of aggregate 
energy savings. In other words, increasing investment subsidies for energy-saving 
technologies can be counterproductive from a policy perspective as they may favor a 
lock-in into relatively inferior technologies. 
 
These results are shown to depend on the nature of technological progress. We derived 
that in the presence of endogenous technological change, a high subsidy scheme may 
yield relatively high accumulated energy savings despite the fact that on average 
relatively inferior technologies are adopted. The reason lies in the (external) learning 
effect. Firms that have adopted the technology generate knowledge on how to improve 
the technology and these returns to learning accrue to firms that have not yet adopted 
the technology. As a result, the technology improves over time and ultimately matures. 
At the time of maturation of the technology a stationary situation arises in which not all 
firms have adopted the technology. A high subsidy scheme stimulates adoption in both 
the short and long run resulting in a relatively high number of firms that has adopted the 
technology, also when it has matured. It is shown that this ‘Scale Effect’ can outweigh 
the effect associated with the adoption of relatively inferior technologies in terms of 
accumulated energy savings. In conclusion, the politically imposed time constraints for 
realizing greenhouse gas emission reductions have induced policy makers to increase 
investment subsidies to stimulate the adoption of energy-saving technologies. The 
answer to the question whether this is a beneficial strategy in terms of accumulated 
energy savings depends crucially on the endogenous nature of technological progress 
and the degree of uncertainty.  
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Appendix A: Solution of the model 
 
To solve the model, we follow Farzin et al. (1998) and calculate the continuation value 
(7). The expected increase in the value of the option to adopt is a function of the 
exogenous rate of technological progress (l ) and the maximum jump size ( u ). These 
parameters are exogenous to individual firms. If a new vintage of the technology 
becomes available, the question is whether it will trigger adoption. Clearly, the 
probability of adoption depends on both the critical value of energy savings that triggers 
adoption (Rn
*, which needs to be determined) and the current state of the technology in 
terms of energy savings, R. The improvement will trigger adoption if the jump in the 
quality of the technology is sufficiently large ( )uuRRn £<-* , whereas no adoption will 
take place if the jump in quality is relatively small ( )RRu n -££ *0 . The probabilities of 
these cases to occur can be determined using equations (2’) and (5’). This yields: 
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The first term between brackets on the right-hand side (RHS) of (A1) reflects the 
expected value of continuation if the jump in the quality of technology is relatively 
small. If this jump (which occurs with likelihood ldt) is relatively small, the technology 
parameter will not exceed the critical value Rn
* after the jump, the investment option is 
kept alive and the decision to invest is postponed. The second term between brackets on 
the RHS reflects the expected termination value: if the improvement in the technology 
is relatively large, the option to invest is executed. Combining equations (A1) and (7) 
yields the value of the option to adopt as a function of the quality of the technology 
under consideration: 
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By definition, at R=Rn
*, investing is optimal after the next jump. Substituting R=Rn
* 
into equation (A2) and using (6), we find: 
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In the optimum it must hold that at the critical technology level, the value of the 
adoption project for the nth firm is equal to its termination value: 
(A4) )()( ** nnnn RRF W= . 
Combining equations (A3) and (6), we derive equation (9) in the main text. 
